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TAX FAIRNESS AND THE TAX MIX . 1
Executive Summary
 Since a society’s tax system is one of the most
basic and essential social institutions, the justice
or fairness of this system is an important subject
for social and political theory, as well as for
practical politics.
 While the most obvious purpose of most taxes is
to raise revenue to finance public expenditures,
taxes are also employed to regulate social and
economic behaviour and to shape the distribution
of economic resources. For this reason, the
concept of tax fairness is necessarily pluralistic,
depending on the particular purpose for which 
the tax is imposed.
 The benefit principle is a fair and legitimate way 
to finance various kinds of publicly provided goods
and services, provided that it is feasible to identify
and measure specific private benefits that the
good or service confers; that access to a merit
good or service is not impeded by the collection 
of a benefit-related charge or tax; and that
distributive concerns are adequately addressed
through other measures. 
 The ability-to-pay approach has considerable appeal
as a principle for allocating the costs of government
expenditures on goods and services the benefits
from which are indeterminate and generally shared,
provided that distributive considerations are
addressed through other measures. 
 Where taxes are designed to regulate social 
and economic behaviour, principles of tax fairness
assume a different character than they do for
revenue collection, having regard to the justice 
of the regulatory goal, the presence of a rational
relationship between the tax or tax incentive and
the regulatory goal, and the distributional effects
produced by the tax or incentive. 
 Where a tax is designed to affect the distribution
of economic resources, principles of tax fairness
dissolve into broader considerations of distributive
justice which determine the manner in which
economic resources are fairly distributed and 
the respective roles of taxes and transfer
payments to achieve this distributive goal.
Although conceptions of distributive justice 
differ significantly, widely shared and normatively
defensible principles of distributive justice support
progressive taxes on income and wealth transfers
in order to moderate inequalities that would
otherwise prevail in the distribution of income 
and wealth, as well as the opportunities that 
result from substantial inheritances.
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Tax Fairness and the Tax Mix
Introduction
Justice, John Rawls famously wrote, is the first virtue
of social institutions.1 Since a society’s tax system 
is one of its most basic and essential social
institutions, the justice or fairness of this tax system
is an important subject for social and political theory,
as well as for practical politics. In order to assess the
fairness of any particular tax or the tax system as 
a whole, however, it is essential to consider the
purpose of the tax and the tax system in general.
Although the most obvious purpose of most taxes is
to raise revenue to finance public expenditures, this 
is not the only rationale for taxation, which may 
also be employed to regulate social and economic
behaviour and to shape the distribution of economic
resources.2 For this reason, the concept of tax
fairness is necessarily pluralistic, depending on 
the particular purpose for which the tax is imposed. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, modern welfare states
typically levy a mix of taxes, including personal and
corporate income taxes, broad-based consumption
taxes, excise taxes on specific goods or services,
payroll taxes, property or wealth taxes, wealth
transfer taxes, as well as user fees and benefit taxes.
This brief considers the concept of tax justice or
fairness in relation to each of these broad goals: the
collection of revenues to finance public expenditures,
the regulation of social and economic behaviour, and
the distribution of economic resources. With respect
to the collection of revenue for public expenditures,
it argues that traditional principles of taxation
according to benefits received and ability to pay
provide useful criteria to assess the justice or
fairness of taxes for this purpose. Regarding the
regulation of social and economic behaviour,
principles of tax fairness necessarily assume a
different character, related to the justice of the
regulatory goal, the presence of a rational
relationship between the tax or tax incentive 
and the regulatory goal, and the distributional effects
produced by the tax or incentive. Finally, it contends,
where a tax is designed to affect the distribution 
of economic resources, principles of tax fairness
dissolve into broader considerations of distributive
justice which determine the manner in which
economic resources are fairly distributed and the
respective roles of taxes and transfer payments to
achieve this distributive goal. Together, the brief
concludes, these principles support a mix of taxes,
including benefit taxes and user fees, a broad-based
consumption tax like a value-added tax (VAT), excise
taxes on specific goods and services, as well as
progressive income and wealth transfer taxes.
Revenue collection
Notwithstanding their reliance on private markets to
supply most goods and services, the public sectors of
most modern welfare states account for a substantial
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP),
representing 36.5 per cent of GDP in the United
Kingdom and 36.2 per cent of GDP in Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries in 2005. While some of these expenditures
represent redistributive expenditures and transfer
payments that are properly considered as part of a
broader discussion of distributive justice, much of 
this revenue is devoted to publicly provided goods
and services such as public security, transportation,
education, public pensions, employment insurance, and
health insurance. Theories of public finance generally
explain the provision of these goods and services on
the grounds that they satisfy social wants that cannot
be supplied efficiently by the private sector or constitute
so-called 'merit goods' that are so essential to human
welfare and flourishing that they should be provided
through the public sector, at least up to a basic
1. Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, p. 1.
2. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, R. (2006) ‘The Three Goals of Taxation’, 
Tax Law Review, 60: 1–28.
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minimum. While the former include so-called ’pure’
public goods and services like public security and
national defence, the latter include quasi-private goods
and services like public education, public pensions, and
health insurance.
Assuming that public provision of these goods 
and services is justified on some account, the key
question for a theory of tax fairness is how the
revenues to finance these expenditures should be
obtained. For this purpose, traditional approaches 
to tax policy have generally supplied two answers,
suggesting that the costs of publicly provided goods
and services should be allocated either according 
to the benefits that individuals and enterprises
derive from government or according to some
comprehensive measure of their taxable capacity 
or ability to pay.3 While the benefit approach 
reflects a conception of tax fairness as transactional
equivalence, according to which one should pay 
only for the goods and services that one receives 
in exchange, the ability-to-pay approach reflects a
conception of tax fairness as equality of sacrifice,
according to which the burden of financing public
expenditures should apply so that whatever
’sacrifices‘ the government requires of taxpayers
’should be made to bear as nearly as possible with
the same pressure upon all’.4
Benefit approach
Since the benefit principle requires individuals and
enterprises to pay only for those publicly provided
goods and services that they themselves enjoy,
without paying for goods and services that
governments provide to others, it might seem 
like an attractive principle to allocate the cost of
government expenditures. Where benefit taxes are
dedicated or earmarked to public expenditures on
the goods and services in respect of which they are
raised, moreover, this method of taxation also has
the notable advantage of simultaneously determining
both the level and structure of government spending
and the manner in which it is financed.
In practice, however, the benefit approach suffers
from three deficiencies as a general principle of 
tax fairness. First, the application of this principle
presumes a just distribution of economic resources,
the achievement of which is apt to demand the
collection of other taxes for distributive purposes.
Second, where the publicly provided good or service
satisfies a merit good that is essential to human
welfare and flourishing (such as education and
health care), benefit taxation may impede access to
the good or service, contradicting the very rationale
for public provision. Finally, it is impossible to apply
the benefit principle to pure public goods and
services (like public security and national defence)
the benefits from which are generally shared,
without resorting to arbitrary presumptions regarding
the manner in which these benefits are distributed.
Despite these limitations, however, the benefit
principle can be a fair and legitimate way to 
finance various kinds of publicly provided goods and
services, provided that it is feasible to identify and
measure specific private benefits that the good or
service confers; that access to a merit good or
service is not impeded by the collection of a benefit-
related charge or tax; and that distributive concerns
are adequately addressed through other measures.
Common examples include publicly provided pensions
as well as employment and health insurance (which
are generally financed in large part through benefit-
related payroll taxes), publicly provided higher
education (which is often partly financed through
tuition fees), and public transportation including
access to highways and roads (which is typically
financed in part through user charges like transit
fees and toll charges or benefit-related taxes like
gasoline taxes). Although concerns about access and
distribution mean that these goods and services are
often subsidized from general government revenues,
the substantial private benefits associated with 
these goods and services suggest that it is fair and
reasonable to finance at least some portion of these
TAX FAIRNESS AND THE TAX MIX . 3
3. See, e.g., Musgrave, R. A. (1959) The Theory of Public Finance:
A Study in Public Economy. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
Inc., pp. 61–115.
4. Mill, J. S. (1970) Principles of Political Economy. London: Penguin
Books, p. 155 [Book V, Chapter. II, Section. 2].
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expenditures from taxes and user fees premised 
on the benefit principle. Indeed, considerations of
economic efficiency, government accountability, 
and tax fairness suggest that modern welfare states
might make greater use of benefit-related taxes to
finance public expenditures in several areas such as
higher education, roads and highways, and municipal
services such as water and sewage and the collection
and disposal of solid waste.
Ability-to-pay approach
As an alternative to the benefit principle of tax
fairness, it is often argued that fair taxes should be
apportioned according to a comprehensive measure
of each individual’s taxable capacity or ability to pay.
Although this ability-to-pay principle is sometimes
rationalized as a surrogate for taxation according to
benefits received, the most prominent conceptions 
of this approach ignore any connection to public
expenditures altogether, treating the collection 
of taxes as ’a common disaster — as though the 
money once collected were thrown into the sea.’5
The rationale for this approach to tax fairness is 
best expressed by John Stuart Mill, who rejected 
the benefit principle as a general principle of tax
fairness on the grounds that government was ’so
preeminently a concern of all‘ that it was pointless
to determine who are ’most interested in it‘ and
argued instead that governments should ’make no
distinction of persons or classes in the strengths 
of their claims upon it‘ as a consequence of which
’whatever sacrifice it requires from them should be
made to bear as nearly as possible with the same
pressure upon all.’6
The ability-to-pay approach has considerable appeal
as a principle for allocating the costs of government
expenditures on goods and services, the benefits
from which are indeterminate and generally shared,
reflecting a principle of political equality that is 
the foundation of a democratic society. As with 
the benefit principle, however, this principle of tax
fairness presumes a just distribution of economic
resources, which may require the collection of 
other taxes.
And yet, the concept of ability-to-pay is notoriously
imprecise. First, it is not obvious whether the
measure of welfare for this purpose should be
assessed at a particular point of time or over a
period of time, nor the appropriate time period 
(e.g., annual or lifetime) should the latter approach
be preferred. Second, it is not clear if the concept 
of equal sacrifice should be understood in terms of
subjective utility or welfare, or rather according to a
more objective measure of each taxpayer’s economic
capacity. Since it is impossible to measure subjective
utility directly, the concept of ability-to-pay must 
be defined in some objective manner if it is to 
serve as a practical basis for distributing tax burdens.
In practice, moreover, the meaning of ability to 
pay has been defined in different ways, reflecting
different interpretations regarding the appropriate 
tax base and structure of tax rates that best
implement this principle of tax fairness. In traditional
approaches to tax policy, the definition of a fair tax
base is described as a matter of ’horizontal equity‘,
while the specification of tax rates is characterized
as a question of ’vertical equity’.
Beginning with the subject of horizontal equity, 
it is often assumed that a person’s annual income
represents the best measure of their ability to 
pay. However, another tradition in tax scholarship
regards annual consumption or expenditure as a
fairer measure of each individual’s taxable capacity
on the basis that the taxation of annual consumption
does not differentiate among taxpayers according 
to the period of time when income is earned 
and consumed. Indeed, Mill himself regarded
consumption as a better measure of ability to pay
than income on the grounds that a labourer who
must save for contingencies and old age does not
have the same ability to pay as a property owner
with the same annual income who can maintain the
5. Blum, W. J. and Kalven, H. Jr. (1952) ‘The Uneasy Case for
Progressive Taxation’, University of Chicago Literary Review, 
19: 417–519 at 517.
6. Mill, supra note 4, p. 155 [Book V, Chapter II, Section 2].
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same level of consumption over time without having
to save for these purposes. For this reason, others
have suggested that wealth should also be taken
into account in assessing a person’s ability to pay.7
Nor have attempts to define the concept of ability-
to-pay yielded any consensus on the preferred
structure of tax rates to give effect to the principle
of vertical equity. Although the concept of ’equal
sacrifice‘ might suggest that any tax should be 
levied at a single or proportionate rate, the idea 
of diminishing marginal utility is often assumed to
justify progressive tax rates on the grounds that 
a larger tax must be imposed at higher levels of
income, consumption, or wealth in order to maintain
the same sacrifice in terms of utility or welfare. 
If equality of sacrifice requires each taxpayer to
experience the same loss of total utility (equal
absolute sacrifice), however, progressive rates are
called for only if the marginal utility of the unit 
that is subject to tax decreases more rapidly than
the increase in the quantity of the unit. Where the
percentage reduction in the utility of the unit subject
to tax is less than the percentage increase in the
quantity of the unit, on the other hand, equal
absolute sacrifice calls for rates to decrease as the
quantity of the unit increases. If equality of sacrifice
is understood proportionately, however, so that
taxpayers are required to surrender an equal 
share of the utility derived from their income,
consumption, or wealth (equal proportionate
sacrifice), progressive rates are generally required. 
Non-welfarist conceptions of equal sacrifice might
also justify progressive rates on the grounds that
taxable capacity however defined increases more
rapidly than increases in the base that is subject to
tax. A version of this non-welfarist approach may
underlie a broad consensus that the ability-to-pay
principle mandates the exemption of a basic amount
of income or consumption necessary for basic needs,
though Mill also favoured a basic exemption on 
the welfarist ground that the sacrifice imposed by 
taxes which apply to expenditures on necessities 
is ’incommensurably‘ higher than that imposed 
by taxes above a subsistence amount.
Aside from these arguments for and against
progressive rates, progressivity is often justified 
in this context on the basis that ’prevailing social
conceptions of equity‘ mandate this approach 
in order to reduce inequality.8 Although broader
conceptions of distributive justice may indeed justify
progressive rates, this justification should not be
confused with whatever justification for progressivity
may exist in order to properly implement a narrower
principle of taxation according to ability to pay.
Indeed, it is an unfortunate feature of many appeals
to the concept of ability-to-pay that they fail to
clearly distinguish between a concept of tax fairness
to govern the collection of revenues for publicly
provided goods and services, and a concept of tax
fairness that is designed to advance a broader
conception of distributive justice.
Shorn of any association with a broader conception
of distributive justice, one might hope that the
concept of ability-to-pay could be defined with 
some precision in order to give effect to its purpose
as a principle of tax fairness to distribute the 
cost of public expenditures in an equal manner. 
Some progress in this direction might also be made
by abandoning utilitarian conceptions of the principle
in favour of an explicitly objective definition that is
more compatible with non-welfarist conceptions of
justice and equality in a liberal society. On this 
basis, for example, one might reject the taxation 
of personal wealth on the grounds that it fails to
respect prior choices to save rather than to spend.
One might also reasonably conclude that equal
taxation for this purpose mandates a proportionate
or single rate above a basic exemption, rather than
progressive rates.
7. Kaldor, N. (1955) An Expenditure Tax. London: George Allen &
Unwin Ltd., p. 33.
8. Ibid., p. 27.
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tax system. Provided that these tax expenditures are
properly identified and accounted for, however, there
is no reason why they should be any more or less
desirable than direct spending programmes. As a
result, provided that the tax incentive is rationally
related to the regulatory goal that it is supposed to
advance, one might expect that the fairness of any
particular tax expenditure should depend solely on
the justice of the regulatory goal that it is designed
to promote. Since tax expenditures can have
different distributive effects, however, a concept
of tax fairness in this context should also consider
the manner in which the resulting tax benefit is
distributed. To the extent that deductions and
exemptions in a progressive income tax with a basic
exemption are worth more to high-income taxpayers
than low-income taxpayers and worth nothing to
taxpayers whose incomes are too low to pay any tax,
tax expenditures that are provided in these forms are
rightly criticized as inequitable. The same criticism
may also be directed at non-refundable tax credits,
which are also worthless to taxpayers whose incomes
are too low to pay any tax.
Turning from tax expenditures to regulatory taxes,
questions of tax fairness also depend on the justice
of the regulatory goal, the existence of a rational
relationship between the tax and the regulatory 
goal, and the distributional effects of the tax. 
Whilst it is not possible within the scope of this brief
to examine the merits of different kinds of regulatory
taxes, a compelling argument for regulatory taxation
is to compel private actors to incorporate otherwise
undervalued costs of their activities, such as
environmental harms, into their economic 
decisions by setting a tax price on the harm. 
While environmental taxes along these lines 
are typically defended on grounds of economic
efficiency, they also reflect a principle of
commutative or corrective justice according to which
those who are responsible for environmental harms
should take responsibility for the damage that they
cause. Where the amount of the tax corresponds to
the amount of the environmental harm, therefore, 
an environmental tax would seem to represent a 
fair and efficienct form of regulatory taxation.
As between income and consumption, the choice 
of an ideal tax base for the purpose of collecting
revenues for publicly provided goods and services 
is more difficult, though Mill's argument that the
labourer who must save for contingencies and old
age does not have the same ability to pay as the
property owner who can maintain the same level 
of consumption without having to save provides 
a compelling argument for consumption taxation.
In conclusion, therefore, these considerations
suggest that a proportionate consumption tax above
a basic exemption might be the most appropriate
way to implement a scheme of fair taxation for the
collection of revenues to finance publicly provided
goods and services that cannot reasonably be
financed according to the benefit principle of 
tax fairness. In practice, such a tax could be
implemented in the form of a personal expenditure
tax under which revenues are included and savings
deducted, but is more easily collected through a
broad-based VAT combined with a universal or
targeted transfer payment designed to offset the 
tax on a minimum amount of tax. Perhaps not
surprisingly, therefore, broad-based VATs and
universal or targeted transfer payments are
commonly found in most developed countries, 
with the notable exception of the United States.
Regulation
A second and entirely distinct purpose of taxation 
is as a regulatory tool. Governments often pursue
regulatory objectives through tax incentives or 
tax expenditures that encourage certain kinds of
behaviour by reducing taxes otherwise payable.
Conversely, governments can also impose regulatory
taxes in order to discourage unwelcome behaviour 
by increasing its price. While these regulatory 
taxes almost inevitably raise some revenue, this is
incidental to their basic purpose to regulate social
and economic behaviour.
There is a considerable literature on tax
expenditures, much of it critical of the complexity
and absence of accountability that can result from
the delivery of these fiscal subsidies through the 
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Distribution
A third important purpose of taxation is to shape 
the distribution of economic resources in a society so
as to promote a particular conception of economic or
distributive justice. To the extent that this conception
of justice mandates the collection of revenues to
finance redistributive programmes or transfers, the
principles of tax fairness that are appropriate for 
this purpose may differ from those governing the
collection of revenues to finance other public
expenditures. Taxes may also shape the distribution
of economic resources directly, through progressive
rates for example, in which case the applicable
principles of tax fairness depend wholly on the
underlying conception of distributive justice that 
the tax is designed to advance.
Although traditional tax policy analysis has tended 
to avoid these broader issues of distributive justice,
addressing only narrower questions of tax equity
in the collection of revenues for government
expenditures, the broader subject of distributive
justice is the proverbial ’elephant in the room’,
without any discussion of which other principles 
of tax fairness necessarily remain incomplete. 
The problem for a comprehensive theory of tax
fairness, however, is that different conceptions of
distributive justice have widely different implications
for the kinds of taxes and expenditures that may or
may not be appropriate for distributive purposes.
Beginning with welfarist approaches, in which
distributive justice is understood as the maximization
of social welfare in accordance with a stipulated
’social welfare function’ (SWF), the purpose of all
redistributive taxes and government expenditures is
to maximize social welfare by redistributing economic
resources in a manner that least affects economic
activities that would occur in the absence of the tax.
On this basis, welfarist approaches tend to favour
proportionate or declining-rate income taxes
combined with redistributive transfer payments, 
or the taxation of personal consumption at
progressive rates.
In contrast to welfarist conceptions of distributive
justice, libertarian conceptions typically reject all
redistributive taxes and transfers on the grounds 
that ’patterned’ or ’end-result’ conceptions of
distributive justice violate people’s rights to the
ownership of property that is justly acquired and
justly transferred.9 As a result, except to the extent
that taxes are justified to correct for past injustices
in the acquisition or transfer of property, libertarian
conceptions of distributive justice generally limit the
sphere of legitimate taxation to the collection of
revenues that are necessary to support the most
basic purposes of government such as the protection
of persons and property.
A third approach to taxation and distributive justice
can be characterized as liberal-egalitarian. Despite
significant variations within this tradition, one can
discern three broad principles that have implications
for taxes and spending in a liberal-egalitarian
society. First, such a society should secure a
framework of equal basic liberties, and minimize
extreme economic inequalities so that citizens can
stand in relation to each other as social and political
equals. Second, such a society should minimize the
distributive consequences of unanticipated and
undeserved fortune, both good and bad, and 
ensure a measure of equal opportunity so that
similar distributive outcomes are reasonably
accessible to all. Third, regardless of the cause 
of their misfortune, such a society should aim to
elevate the position of the least well-off. Applied to
the context of taxes and spending, these principles
might reasonably favour progressive income and
wealth transfer taxes in order to moderate economic
inequalities and opportunities and minimize the
distributive consequences of undeserved good
fortune, as well as social insurance programmes 
to compensate people for unanticipated and
undeserved misfortune and transfer payments and
other programmes to improve the economic position
of the least well-off.
9. Nozick, R. (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic
Books, pp. 149–231.
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Although it is impossible in the context of this brief
to address each of these conceptions of distributive
justice in detail, nor the full implications of each
conception for taxation and spending, two lines 
of argument suggest that the liberal-egalitarian
approach as outlined should be preferred to the
welfarist and libertarian conceptions. First, as 
a theoretical matter, neither welfarism nor
libertarianism constitutes a persuasive theory 
of justice, since the former (as Rawls famously
explained) ’does not take seriously the distinction
between persons’10 while the latter is arguably
incompatible with the conception of free and equal
persons on which it is based.11 In practice, moreover,
the tax and spending policies recommended by the
liberal-egalitarian approach are broadly consistent
with those actually found in modern liberal-
democratic welfare states, suggesting that this
conception of distributive justice is generally shared in
these societies. As a result, it follows, widely shared
and normatively defensible principles of distributive
justice support progressive taxes on income and
wealth transfers in order to moderate inequalities
that would otherwise prevail in the distribution of
income and wealth as well as the opportunities 
that result from substantial inheritances.
Conclusion
Since taxes have different purposes, the concept of
tax fairness is inescapably plural, assuming different
forms according to the purpose of the tax that is
subject to investigation. This brief has considered
three purposes for taxation — to collect revenues 
to finance publicly provided goods and services, 
to regulate social and economic behaviour, and to
shape the distribution of economic resources — and
examined principles of tax fairness applicable to 
each. Where taxes are collected in order to finance
government expenditures on goods and services, 
the traditional benefit and ability-to-pay approaches
provide useful principles of tax fairness. Where taxes
serve a regulatory purpose, the fairness of the tax 
or tax incentive depends on the fairness of the
regulatory objective, the relationship between 
the tax measure and the regulatory goal, and the
distributional implications of the tax or incentive. 
The use of taxes for distributive purposes depends 
on the underlying concept of distributive justice, as 
a consequence of which the concept of tax fairness
dissolves into broader questions of distributive justice.
Within this pluralistic normative framework, this brief
has also reached specific conclusions with respect 
to the kinds of taxes that might reasonably exist for
each of these purposes, favouring the use of benefit
taxes and user fees for specific purposes, a broad-
based VAT to collect revenues for more general
government expenditures, regulatory environmental
taxes, as well as progressive income and wealth
transfer taxes. Although all of these taxes are not
found in all modern welfare states, and the extent 
to which different countries rely on different taxes
differs, most of these taxes are found in most
modern welfare states, suggesting that our tax
practices are broadly compatible with principles 
of tax justice or fairness.
8 . TAX FAIRNESS AND THE TAX MIX
10. Rawls, supra note 1 at 27.
11. See Duff, D. G. (2005) ’Private Property and Tax Policy in a
Libertarian World: A Critical Review’, Canadian Journal of Law and
Jurisprudence, 18: 40–3.
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